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Populism and the recasting of the ideological landscape of liberal democracies 




The upsurge in anti-establishment protests in Western liberal democracies in the early 21st 
century– a phenomenon typically labeled as ‘populism’ -- has profoundly altered the 
ideological landscape of these societies. The grievances against social, economic, political 
and cultural precarisation which these movements have formulated are an expression of 
social anxiety, itself generated by the intensified competitive pressures of globally 
integrated capitalism. As a result, the standard Left-Right ideological divide is being replaced 
by a new cleavage – a Risk-Opportunity divide shaped by conflicting attitudes towards the 
perceived and anticipated social effect of neoliberal globalization.  
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The rise of the anti-establishment vote 
Ideologically unconventional parties and movements that opposed globalization but 
espoused free market capitalism domestically while also demanding social protection -- such 
as the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands, the White March movement in Belgium, ATTAC in 
France and Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal -- began mobilizing well before the economic and 
social crisis that the 2007-2009 financial meltdown triggered (Azmanova 2004). This 
mobilization began in the 1990s -- the most prosperous decade of the 20th century in terms 
of economic growth (Stiglitz 2003). By then, however, the social effect of neoliberal 
globalization began to be felt.  
Since the 1980s, center-left and center-right governments had committed to global market 
integration. They sought to ensure the competitiveness of national economies in the global 
marketplace via product- and labor market deregulation, as well as by cutting expenditures 
for public services and social insurance. This coincided with the Information Technology 
revolution, which, combined with the liberalization of finance, enabled low-cost market 
entry as well as access to countries with cheap supplies of labour. These policy changes 
generated a political economy marked by the proliferation of both economic opportunities 
(for employment and profit) and social risks (of job loss and loss of investment). Overall, this 
led to the massification of economic and social insecurity into a generalised precarity – “a 
condition of existence without predictability or security, affecting material or psychological 
welfare” (Collins Dictionary).  
Precarity is strongly economically stratified. It encompasses a variety of experiences related 
to the insecurity of livelihoods – from the economic misery of the ‘precariat’, a group akin to 
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the ‘proletariat’ (Standing 2011), to the psychological strain of what Alissa Quart (2018) has 
called the “middle precariat” - a professional class encompassing professors, nurses, 
administrators in middle management, caregivers, and lawyers, all struggling to cope with 
life in the “always on” economy. Within the remit of precarity belong also the grievances 
about poor work-life balance of the highly skilled professionals in the IT industry and the 
managers of international corporations who are particularly subjected to the ever 
intensifying pressures of global economic competition.1 Precarity has thus become the 
social malaise of the 21st century (Azmanova 2020). At the same time, a series of corruption 
and mismanagement scandals beset political and economic elites (e.g. the accounting 
scandal at Enron in 2001, the 2008 United Kingdom parliamentary expenses scandal).  
The destabilization of the socioeconomic environment (despite growth and low 
unemployment) and the discrediting of the establishment enabled populist leaders to 
mobilize unprecedented electoral support by claiming that ruling elites were reaping the 
benefits of growing prosperity yet leaving society in ruins. These sentiments were deepened 
by the 2008 crisis but were not generated by it. In this context, anti-establishment parties 
and movements began their assent in electoral politics, articulating their rejection of 
precarity into a policy agenda constituted by key elements: physical insecurity, political 
disorder, cultural estrangement, and employment insecurity – the components of a new  
‘order-and-security’, anti-precarity, agenda (Azmanova 2004). Such sentiments were 
generated not necessarily by impoverishment, job loss, or damages to collective cultural 
identities, but to perceived and anticipated losses of livelihoods and damages to social 
status, most often attributed to the effect of ‘open border’ policies.  
The articulation of this substantive policy platform casts doubt on the appropriateness of 
assigning the term ‘populism’ to these political entities. Populism is usually described as an 
anti-establishment stance without a specific content (Laclau 2005,15); its distinctive feature 
is a purely reactive stance to political rule (Judis 2016; Müller 2016), an engagement with 
what Max Weber (1994,165) called ‘negative politics’ -- hostile confrontation without a 
coherent programmatic stance and with no credible ambition to govern. Many of the parties 
described as ‘populist’ have managed to enter parliaments and governments thereby 
effectively engaging with political rule. They have done so on a policy platform for 
accountable and democratic politics (e.g. calls for restraining the power of corporations and 
the political establishment), revising trade agreements in view of protection of national 
businesses, and curbing immigration (Azmanova 2018).  
However, as these formations appeal for cultural, economic and social protection, they 
cannot confidently be positioned along the left-right ideological divide that has structured 
the landscape of electoral politics throughout the life of liberal democracies. This suggests 
that a profound alteration of these societies’ ideological landscape is under way.  
 
 
1 A 2015 survey of US individuals with a net worth of over one million dollars found that 87 percent of those 
interviewed expressed an “ever-present fear of losing it all” (UBS 2015, 2).  
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Changes in the ideological map of capitalist democracies 
Ever since the French revolution of 1789 set the left-right vectors of ideological orientation 
and the rise of class politics in late 19th century infused the left-right divide with the capital-
labor dynamics of social conflict, the ideological landscape of capitalist democracies has 
been structured along two axes. A horizontal, economic, axis configured attitudes to state 
intervention in the domestic economy – in a spectrum between free markets on the Right 
and regulated markets on the Left. A vertical axis structured public demand and policy 
supply regarding culture -- with preferences spanning from traditional values on the right to 
liberal ones on the left. A peculiarity of the twentieth-century political landscape was that 
ideological preferences combining economic and cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and 
cultural and economic protectionism, on the other, were marginal. The landscape of 
electoral politics was dominated by Socialist and Social Democratic parties on the left and 
Conservative and Christian Democratic parties to the right.  
 
Figure 1: Ideological Landscape 20th Century  
Please insert Figure 1 here 
 
At the very end of the twentieth century analysists registered that disagreements between 
the big political families regarding economic policy had almost disappeared; subsequently, 
the main distribution of policy preferences aligned almost completely with the vertical axis 
opposing liberal to conservative sociocultural positions (Kitschelt 2004). Ideological cross-
class voting (e.g., workers voting for center-right parties) and the rise of ‘catch-all’ parties in 
the late twentieth century prompted diagnoses that the left-right electoral divide was 
disappearing without being replaced by a new overarching paradigm (McKnight 2005; Mair 
2007; Perrineau 2002). 
The upsurge in unorthodox (‘populist’) parties and movements at the close of the twentieth 
century, however, is suggesting the emergence of a novel overarching paradigm. In partisan 
terms, many of these new formations are expressing a seemingly incongruous set of stances 
combining cultural liberalism (e.g. regarding gender equality and LGBT rights) with anti-
Muslim sentiment, endorsement of free markets domestically, opposition to global trade, 
and appeals for a social safety net. 
The novel dynamics of electoral competition and ideological contestation signal not only a 
new aggregation of preferences regarding economy and culture (away from the prevalent 
clustering of free market and cultural traditionalism on the right and the regulated market 
and cultural liberalism on the left), but a change in the nature of the ideological fault lines of 
political conflict and cooperation. Thus, in the current context, the economic axis no longer 
denotes attitudes to state intervention in the economy (between free and regulated 
markets) -- the neoliberal consensus has ended the salience of this issue altogether as 
center-left parties shifted to the right on economic policy. The free-versus-regulated market 
policy contention of the late twentieth century has been effectively recast by attitudes to 
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globalization, forming an axis spanning market openness versus closed domestic markets. 
The former dichotomy concerns domestic economic policy, the latter -- foreign trade. 
(Azmanova 2011, 2020). 
The content of the cultural axis of political contestation has also altered. The progressive 
agenda of civil rights, identity recognition, and ecological concerns came to be accepted by 
most center-right parties in Europe as well as by the moderate wing of the Republican Party 
in the United States. The mainstreaming of identity politics together with the rise of new 
public concerns about political mismanagement and physical risks (especially following the 
wave of terrorist attacks) has given rise to a new frame of reference articulating politically 
salient social concerns along the cultural axis of ideological battles. Attitudes to immigration 
became a key element in this new framework. Consequently, the liberal-versus-traditionalist 
cultural divide has been replaced by a cosmopolitanism-versus-nationalism dichotomy, 
fostered by contrasting judgments on the impact and desirability of open border policies.   
This recasting of the ideological landscape has translated into a novel aggregation of public 
demand and political supply in electoral politics. A new alliance of social forces is being 
formed around a “risk” (or “fear”) pole of political mobilization. Here parts of capital and 
labor align behind policies of economic patriotism, a combination of domestic market 
liberalization and a closed (protected) economy, as well as cultural sovereigntism, typically 
voiced in anti-immigrant rhetoric. An opposite pole is forming by parties and their 
supporters who experience globalization as an advantage in terms of wealth creation, and 
increasingly flexible and versatile lifestyles, as well as those celebrating the capacity of new 
technologies to mitigate climate change and improve societal wellbeing. The emerging new 
societal alliances are replacing the old left-right axis of ideological orientation with an 
opportunity-risk divide, shaped by attitudes to the social effect of globalization (Ibid.).  
Figure 2: Ideological Landscape 21st Century 
Please insert Figure 2 here.  
The Coronavirus pandemic that beset these societies in the spring of 2020, as well as the 
efforts to cope with the ensuing economic crisis, has exacerbated both the condition of 
general social precarity and aggravated existing inequalities. This is likely to stabilize the 
nascent radical transformation of the ideological landscape of capitalist liberal democracies.   
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